Rafael Brunati and Celso Basílio, lawyers at Silveiro Advogados specializing in regulated markets, corporate law, and competition law, analyze the recent measures adopted by Brazil’s National Monetary Council (CMN) and the Secretariat of Prizes and Betting (SPA/MF) and their impact on the iGaming and sports betting industry.

In this article, they examine how the new regulatory framework reshapes the boundaries between betting, financial instruments, and emerging digital market models, while reinforcing Law No. 14,790/2023 as the central pillar of regulation in the sector.

ByRafael Brunati and Celso Basílio

The set of measures recently adopted by the National Monetary Council (CMN) and the Secretariat of Prizes and Betting of the Ministry of Finance (SPA/MF) marks a new chapter in the regulatory consolidation of Brazil’s iGaming and sports betting market.

More than a targeted response to so-called predictive markets, these initiatives signal a broader effort to redefine the boundaries between authorized betting activities, financial instruments, and operations considered irregular in the country.

CMN Resolution No. 5,298/2026 prohibited the offering and trading of derivatives linked to betting, sports events, online games, and political, electoral, cultural, or entertainment themes without a financial-economic reference.

In the same direction, SPA/MF Technical Note No. 2,958/2026 classified predictive market platforms as illegal fixed-odds betting operations, leading to the blocking of dozens of platforms by Anatel.

The move clearly reinforces Law No. 14,790/2023 as the exclusive regulatory framework for fixed-odds betting in Brazil.

In practice, the government has begun to draw a sharper line around who can operate in this market and under what conditions.

Platforms that previously positioned themselves as financial markets, event-based contracts, or alternative technological structures are now being materially treated as betting operators.

The regulatory message is direct: if a product targets the same audience, uses similar economic logic to betting, and involves risk linked to future events, it is likely to fall within the SPA’s regulatory perimeter.

From a competitive and regulatory standpoint, this produces a meaningful effect for licensed operators. Companies that have invested in licensing, compliance, anti-money laundering controls, sports integrity, responsible gaming policies, and regulatory infrastructure are no longer competing with platforms operating outside these requirements under alternative legal interpretations.

This indirectly strengthens the economic value of the license granted by the SPA.

At the same time, this strengthening comes with a significant increase in operational and compliance obligations.

The recent measures also reopen an important discussion on the regulatory limits of so-called betting exchanges and peer-to-peer models.

SPA/MF Technical Note No. 2,958/2026 itself acknowledges that betting between users and the existence of dynamic pricing do not necessarily alter the nature of fixed-odds betting.

This interpretation is relevant because it brings predictive markets closer to exchange-style betting structures already contemplated under Law No. 14,790/2023.

This point could, in the future, open space for regulated betting exchange models in Brazil, provided they fall within the SPA’s authorized perimeter. However, operational rules for such formats have not yet been defined by the regulator, leaving a significant area of uncertainty for operators seeking product innovation.

From another perspective, these measures are also likely to generate substantial litigation.

There are important debates regarding the limits of the CMN’s authority to restrict certain types of derivatives, the SPA’s interpretative role regarding predictive markets, and even the blocking of platforms without judicial orders.

Regardless of the outcome of these disputes, the fact is that Brazil’s iGaming and sports betting market is entering a new phase.

Regulatory logic is no longer focused solely on formal authorization to operate, but increasingly incorporates issues such as financial integrity, protection of vulnerable users, data governance, payment traceability, and continuous operational supervision.

The sector continues to grow, but now within a significantly more sophisticated—and more demanding—environment. For licensed operators, this simultaneously creates a barrier to entry for unregulated competitors and increases compliance costs.

In an increasingly regulated market, competitive advantage is likely to depend less on the ability to offer bets and more on the capacity to operate with regulatory security, operational integrity, and rapid adaptation to new state requirements.

Rafael Brunati is a lawyer specializing in Corporate Law, Contracts, M&A, Private Equity, and Banking Law at Silveiro Advogados.

He holds a Law degree from Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie, an LL.M in Corporate Law from INSPER, and is a member of the Banking Law Commission of the São Paulo Chapter of the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB/SP).

Celso Basílio is a lawyer specializing in Regulated Markets, Telecommunications, Contracts, and Competition Law at Silveiro Advogados.

He holds a Master’s degree in Law from FGV Direito SP, an LL.M in Contract Law from INSPER, and a Law degree from Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie.

La Resolución 5.298 del Consejo Monetario Nacional de Brasil establece un límite regulatorio claro para los mercados de predicción como Polymarket y Kalshi.

En este análisis, Carlos Akira Sato examina cómo la medida refleja un cambio profundo en la arquitectura financiera de Brasil, redefiniendo qué califica como un instrumento financiero legítimo y estableciendo límites a la financiarización de eventos no económicos.

Carlos Akira Sato es cofundador de Fenynx Digital Assets y especialista en mercados regulados, infraestructura financiera y juego responsable.

En este artículo de opinión, argumenta que la Resolución 5.298 de Brasil no se trata tanto de prohibir Polymarket y Kalshi, sino de definir los límites de la próxima generación del sistema financiero.

La publicación de la Resolución nº 5.298 del Consejo Monetario Nacional establece, de forma inequívoca, un nuevo límite para la actuación de plataformas como Polymarket y Kalshi en el país. La conclusión es directa: estos modelos dejan de encontrar espacio regulatorio en Brasil. Pero la relevancia de la decisión no reside en la prohibición en sí, sino en lo que revela sobre el futuro de la arquitectura financiera.

La Resolución 5.298 no aborda explícitamente los mercados predictivos. Actúa en un plano más profundo, al redefinir qué puede considerarse un instrumento financiero legítimo.

Al exigir que los contratos estén vinculados a variables económicas con formación objetiva de precios, el regulador elimina la posibilidad de estructurar instrumentos —por sofisticados que parezcan— basados en eventos políticos, sociales o conductuales. No se trata de un ajuste periférico, sino de un reposicionamiento conceptual.

Durante años, plataformas como Polymarket y Kalshi prosperaron precisamente en la ambigüedad. No son casas de apuestas tradicionales ni encajan completamente como bolsas de derivados.

Operan en un territorio intermedio: contratos basados en probabilidades, lenguaje financiero y una promesa implícita de descubrimiento eficiente de precios sobre el futuro. Esa zona gris siempre fue su principal activo y también su mayor riesgo regulatorio. Lo que Brasil ha hecho ahora es eliminarla.

El punto más sofisticado de la resolución está en su diseño. El Consejo Monetario Nacional no atacó la tecnología, ni el formato de las plataformas, ni su ubicación. Atacó la esencia: la naturaleza del riesgo negociado.

Al hacerlo, volvió irrelevante si la operación se realiza mediante contratos bilaterales, plataformas offshore o protocolos basados en blockchain. Si el riesgo no es económico, el contrato no es admisible. Es una forma de regulación que privilegia la sustancia sobre la forma y que, por ello, tiende a ser más resiliente.

Esta decisión proyecta efectos más allá del debate sobre apuestas. Dialoga directamente con la discusión sobre tokenización y con la idea, ampliamente difundida en los últimos años, de que cualquier evento podría convertirse en un activo digital.

Brasil señala lo contrario: la innovación es bienvenida, pero no ilimitada. La tokenización encuentra legitimidad cuando está anclada en la economía real —crédito, cuentas por cobrar, activos productivos— y la pierde cuando intenta capturar comportamientos, opiniones o eventos sociales como base de negociación.

Es en este punto donde la resolución también revela una tensión institucional. El propio texto normativo asigna a la CVM la responsabilidad de emitir regulación complementaria. La elección es jurídicamente comprensible, pero institucionalmente discutible.

Si el propio diagnóstico del regulador reconoce que se trata de instrumentos híbridos —que transitan entre derivados, valores mobiliarios y estructuras de captación—, la ausencia de una iniciativa conjunta desde el inicio resulta llamativa. La opción de una regulación secuencial, con el CMN estableciendo directrices y la CVM detallando la normativa, introduce un desfase que puede reabrir temporalmente la misma zona gris que se busca cerrar.

La paradoja es evidente. La resolución es sofisticada al atacar la esencia económica de los contratos, pero fragmenta la ejecución regulatoria al distribuir competencias de forma no simultánea.

En un entorno donde la innovación financiera ocurre en la intersección de distintos regímenes —bancario, mercado de capitales y, en ciertos casos, apuestas—, la coordinación deja de ser deseable para convertirse en necesaria. La falta de sincronía puede generar interpretaciones divergentes, inseguridad jurídica y, sobre todo, oportunidades residuales de arbitraje.

Aun así, el núcleo de la decisión permanece sólido. Al restringir lo que puede considerarse un activo financiero, Brasil establece un límite silencioso pero poderoso a la financiarización de la realidad. No todo evento puede convertirse en un contrato. No toda expectativa puede convertirse en un precio. Y no todo lo que puede tokenizarse debe necesariamente negociarse.

Decir que Polymarket y Kalshi no pueden operar en Brasil es, por tanto, correcto. Pero es solo la superficie. Lo que está en juego es la definición de las fronteras de la próxima generación del sistema financiero.

Un sistema que seguirá incorporando tecnología e innovación, pero que, al menos en el caso brasileño, permanecerá anclado en la economía real. Y en ese proceso, la calidad de la coordinación entre reguladores será tan determinante como la claridad de las propias reglas.

Carlos Akira Sato – Cofundador de Fenynx Digital Assets. Especialista en mercados regulados, infraestructura financiera, gobernanza, innovación y juego responsable.

 Brazil’s National Monetary Council Resolution 5.298 marks a clear regulatory boundary for prediction markets such as Polymarket and Kalshi.

In this analysis, Carlos Akira Sato examines how the measure reflects a deeper shift in Brazil’s financial architecture, redefining what qualifies as a legitimate financial instrument and setting limits on the financialisation of non-economic events.

Carlos Akira Sato is co-founder of Fenynx Digital Assets and a specialist in regulated markets, financial infrastructure and responsible gambling.

In this op-ed, he argues that Brazil’s Resolution 5.298 is less about banning Polymarket and Kalshi than about defining the boundaries of the next generation of the financial system.

Brazil’s National Monetary Council Resolution 5.298 sets an unambiguous limit for platforms such as Polymarket and Kalshi in the country. The conclusion is straightforward: these models no longer find regulatory space in Brazil. But the significance of the decision lies not in the prohibition itself,  it lies in what it reveals about the future of financial architecture.

Resolution 5.298 does not explicitly address prediction markets. It operates at a deeper level, redefining what can be considered a legitimate financial instrument. By requiring that contracts be tied to economic variables with objective price formation, the regulator eliminates the possibility of structuring instruments, however sophisticated in appearance, based on political, social or behavioural events. This is not a peripheral adjustment. It is a conceptual repositioning.

For years, platforms like Polymarket and Kalshi thrived precisely on ambiguity. They are not traditional bookmakers, nor do they fit neatly as derivatives exchanges. They operate in an intermediate territory,  contracts based on probabilities, financial language and an implicit promise of efficient price discovery about the future. That grey zone was always their main asset, and their greatest regulatory risk. What Brazil has now done is eliminate it.

The most sophisticated aspect of the resolution lies in its design. The CMN did not target the technology, the format of the platforms, or their location. It targeted the essence: the nature of the risk being traded. In doing so, it made irrelevant whether the operation occurs through bilateral contracts, offshore platforms or blockchain-based protocols. If the risk is not economic, the contract is not admissible. It is a form of regulation that privileges substance over form — and is, for that reason, likely to prove more resilient.

This decision projects effects well beyond the gambling debate. It speaks directly to the discussion around tokenisation and the widely held idea in recent years that any event could be converted into a digital asset. Brazil signals the opposite. Innovation is welcome, but not unlimited. Tokenisation finds legitimacy when anchored in the real economy, credit, receivables, productive assets, and loses it when it attempts to capture behaviour, opinion or social events as the basis for trading.

It is at this point that the resolution also reveals an institutional tension. The normative text itself assigns to the CVM the responsibility of issuing complementary regulation. The choice is legally understandable, but institutionally questionable.

If the regulator’s own diagnosis recognises that these are hybrid instruments, moving between derivatives, securities and fundraising structures, the absence of a joint initiative from the outset is notable. The option for sequential regulation, with the CMN setting guidelines and the CVM filling in the detail, introduces a lag that may temporarily reopen the very grey zone it intends to close.

The paradox is evident. The resolution is sophisticated in attacking the economic essence of contracts, but fragments regulatory execution by distributing competencies non-simultaneously.

In an environment where financial innovation occurs at the intersection of different regimes, banking, capital markets and, in certain cases, gambling, coordination ceases to be desirable and becomes necessary. The lack of synchrony may generate divergent interpretations, legal uncertainty and, above all, residual arbitrage opportunities.

Even so, the core of the decision remains solid. By restricting what can be considered a financial asset, Brazil establishes a silent but powerful limit on the financialisation of reality. Not every event can be turned into a contract. Not every expectation can be converted into a price. And not everything that can be tokenised should necessarily be traded.

To say that Polymarket and Kalshi cannot operate in Brazil is therefore correct, but it is only the surface. What is at stake is the definition of boundaries for the next generation of the financial system. A system that will continue to incorporate technology and innovation, but that, at least in the Brazilian case, will remain anchored in the real economy. And in that process, the quality of coordination between regulators will be as decisive as the clarity of the rules themselves.

Carlos Akira Sato is co-founder of Fenynx Digital Assets and a specialist in regulated markets, financial infrastructure and responsible gambling. In this op-ed, he argues that Brazil’s Resolution 5.298 is less about banning Polymarket and Kalshi than about defining the boundaries of the next generation of the financial system.